model represents a new way to consider retail demand for the entire "shopping-basket."
The objective of this paper is to determine whether pricing and assortment behavior by retailers, both upstream with respect to manufacturers and downstream with respect to consumers, is consistent with a two-sided demand environment. And if it is, we aim to describe the nature of retailers' behavior and compare it to other industries where network effects are more common and well understood. In estimating the upstream pricing behavior of supermarket retailers, we also contribute to the retailing literature in that we develop a method for inferring the price of shelf space, or slotting fees in more usual terminology.
In the first section, we develop an economic model of two-sided demand in the retail supermarket industry. An econometric model is developed in the second section that is able to test the implications of network pricing by retailers. This model consists of both downstream (consumer) and upstream (manufacturer) components. We describe our data and estimation methods in the third section, and present the results in a fourth. A concluding section offers some implications both for supermarket retailing strategy and as a potential explanation for emerging trends in the industry.
Economic Model of Supermarket Retailers as Two-Sided Demand Platforms
The theoretical literature on pricing in markets with two-sided demand is very rich as there are a number of examples, each subtly different from the other. Katz and Shapiro (1985) , Tirole (2002, 2003) , Armstrong (2006) presents the general case for a multi-retailer platform and an advertising platform such as a magazine or yellow pages. In a two-firm Hotelling-type Our empirical model consists of two parts. On the retailer side, we specify a model of categorylevel demand and retail pricing in which consumer demand is a function of the variety of products offered by each retailer. On the manufacturer side, we estimate a model of demand for shelf-space where demand rises in the traffic generated by each platform. Both sides imply equilibrium pricing relationships, which we solve for the impact of store traffic and retail variety on platform pricing strategy. Retailers, the platform owner, set prices for both products sold to consumers and for shelf space sold to manufacturers. This latter relationship, however, is complicated by the nature of strategic vertical interaction between channel members. In this regard, we follow the recent literature (Draganska and Klapper, 2007; Villas-Boas, 2007; Sudhir, 2001 ) and assume manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders as they set wholesale prices taking expected reactions of retailers into account.
Consumer Demand
Due to the complexity of the relationships studied here, we use relatively simple specifications for consumer demand. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) introduced the constant elasticity of substitution demand system (CES) as a parsimonious representation of demand that "...already embodies the desirability of variety... " (p. 297) . In one recent application of the CES to a similar problem to that considered here, Nair, Chintagunta, and Dube (2004) model the continuous demand for PDA software using a CES demand system, and the demand for hardware using a discrete-choice, nested logit specification. In theoretical applications of retail competition in which consumers choose stores according to a discrete process and then spend according to a CES pattern , Peng 6 and Tabuchi (2007) and Hamilton and Richards (2007) both nest CES product-demand systems within Hotelling-type spatial competition models. However, a Hotelling linear-city model is incapable of representing competition among several stores simultaneously. Moreover, a Hotelling model is not well suited to empirical estimation. Therefore, we adopt a nested logit model of store choice (Anderson and de Palma, 1992) .
During any given week, a consumer is assumed to buy his or her food from either one of the supermarkets in town, or from an outside option. Our model represents a true "shopping basket" demand model in that consumers are assumed to buy at least one product from each of the top-10 categories within the fixed-weight product-type and from an "other" category that captures all purchases, or none at all. This approach extends Manchanda, Ansari and Gupta (1999) who create a shopping-basket model of demand, but consider only a limited set of products. Our approach, therefore, is more similar to Smith (2004) who considers aggregate store demand rather than the demand for individual brands. With this assumption, we use category-level data to measure store-share because it is the choice of store that is discrete, not the choice of category. The outside option consists of restaurants, convenience stores, or similar outlets. Consumers substitute among retail stores more readily than between supermarkets and the outside option, so their decision consists of two nests, the outside option being the only member of one nest. Utility from the combined choice is random and extreme value distributed so the store-selection model is given by the familiar nested logit specification (Berry, 1994; Cardell, 1997) .
Beginning with a consumer's continuous demand for products within a particular store, j assume consumer i visits store j and obtains utility from buying goods n = 1, 2, ... N during week 7 t as given by the CES demand model: it where is a CES quantity index, y is the numeraire good, and 0 < è < 1, and 0 < ó < 1 assure concavity of the utility function. With direct utility defined over goods, the consumer chooses the quantity of each good subject to the usual budget constraint such that the inverse demand for goods is written:
This inverse demand system implies a direct demand system, written as a function of the prices of all goods sold in store j:
where is the CES price index. Nair, Chintagunta, Dube (2004) recognize, however, that (3) is not practical for estimation purposes if prices are not available for individual items, nor does it capture the demand for variety in an explicit way. Therefore, we assume prices Smith (2004) uses survey data on a large number of shoppers in the U.K. Although he reports a number 1 of "secondary" or in-fill visits to other than the primary store due to either errors, stock-outs or missing varieties, the proportion of shopping trips that fall into this category are few enough to be ignored without invalidating the data.
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within each category for a particular retailer are symmetric and marginal acquisition costs are the same. With this assumption, the CES prices index simplifies to: so the demand system is re-written as:
jt where p represents an average price for a product offered in store j. Substituting (5) into (1) yields the indirect utility function for consumer i from store j:
which is, explicitly, a function of the number of products offered in store j, the average price and the consumer's income. This utility function forms the basis for consumers' choice of stores, which is discussed next.
Consumers are assumed to be randomly distributed in the geographic space surrounding each store. Further, we assume they choose to visit only one store -the store that provides the most total surplus, where surplus is defined as utility less purchase cost. Net surplus from 1 visiting each store is found by subtracting the optimal expenditure on goods sold by retailer j from indirect utility. The resulting surplus function is given by:
9 for each store j.
Due to heterogeneity in consumer preferences, net surplus is inherently random. As a result, store choice is driven by a discrete choice that depends on the realization of the random surplus for household i. Specifically, net surplus in (7) is randomly distributed according to:
where S is interpreted as the level of mean surplus for consumer i, î is an error term that is unobserved to the econometrician and reflects such things as local advertising campaigns, inijt store promotions, merchandising or other demand shifters not included in the data, v is an iid ijt extreme-value distributed error term and g is a random variable that possesses the unique distribution such that the entire term is extreme-value distributed (Cardell, 1997) .
In this expression, ë is the nested logit scale parameter, which is also interpreted as a measure of the degree of substitutability between nests, in this case food purchased from supermarkets and food purchased from some other outlet. If there is no difference, then consumers regard their sources of food as perfect substitutes (ë = 1.0) and the model reduces to a traditional logit choice specification.
Within this random-utility framework, the probability that a consumer chooses store j is given by:
10
With the distributional assumptions made above, the probability of choosing store j can then be represented by a standard nested logit model (Anderson and de Palma, 1992; Berry, 1994; Cardell, 1997) where the surplus from one option, commonly referred to as the outside option, has been normalized to zero. Because the CES utility model describes a representative consumer under a relatively non-restrictive set of assumptions (Andersen, de Palma and Thisse, 1992), we then aggregate the individual choice probabilities to arrive at an expression for the market share of store j that is written as (suppressing the time subscript for clarity):
where S is the aggregation of individual surplus functions, s is the share of store j among all J supermarkets, s is the share of supermarkets in total food purchases, and represents the inclusive value from shopping at all supermarkets so that Faced with a total market size of M, therefore, the quantity sold by store j is written as:
Following a derivation similar to Berry (1994) , the mean surplus function becomes:
j where is the share of the outside option, and î is the econometric error term.
Substituting equation (7) into (11), and solving for each store's market share gives the estimated nested logit model as a function of shelf prices and the number of products stocked by each store:
or, for estimation purposes:
because neither ó nor è are separately identified in the demand model. Further, both prices and assortment breadth are likely to be endogenous, so the store choice model is estimated with generalized method of moments (Newey and West, 1987; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995) , which is consistent if the appropriate set of instruments are chosen for both variables.
Wholesale and Retail Pricing Model
Given the demand framework outlined above, platform owners (retailers) are assumed to behave strategically with respect to each other and vertically with their suppliers. Specifically, we assume retailers set prices for both consumer goods and store shelves according to the following two-stage game. Consistent with the literature on retail pricing, supermarkets behave as Stackelberg followers: manufacturers set wholesale prices given their expectations of how retailers will respond, and retailers then set prices paid by consumers (Draganska and Klapper,
2007). Because retailers possess a measure of market power, however, they are able to extract the resulting surplus from the channel by setting fixed fees (slotting, promotional allowances, or similar) in a two-part pricing framework (Slade, 1995; Bonnet, et al, 2006; Berto-Villas Boas, 2007) . We solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the usual way: by working backward from the retailer to the manufacturer's problem.
In the literature on structural modeling of retailer-manufacturer relationships (Choi, 1991; Sudhir, 2001; Chintagunta, 2002; Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005; Berto Villas-Boas, 2007; Draganska and Klapper, 2007) this assumption is common (and is often verified statistically), but is a simplification that does not encompass the case where retailers serve as a platform for manufacturers products. Bonnet, et al. (2006) and Berto Villas-Boas (2007) allow for non-linear pricing where two-part tariffs may describe the role of shelf-space prices, but these models envision manufacturers setting the terms, and extracting the rent, and not the reverse which is the more realistic case. To demonstrate the effect of non-linear pricing on retailers' decisions and, hence, the price of shelf space, we first present the more usual Bertrand-Nash solution and then introduce a simple two-part tariff framework.
Beginning with the retailer decision, and suppressing the time period index (t) for clarity, nj retailer j sets the price for each product, p , each week to solve the following problem:
where M is total market demand, w is the wholesale price, and s is the market share defined above. To simplify the derivation, and without loss of generality, we assume retailing costs are
(14)
Although it is likely the case that some of the same brands are sold in different retailers, we follow 
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zero. Under the manufacturer-Stackelberg assumption, retailers set prices taking wholesale prices as given. Because our model is designed to capture the entire shopping basket from a consumer perspective, in writing (14) we assume retailers maximize profit not only on a category basis as is more commonly assumed (Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005, for example), but across the whole store. If shelf-space allocation decisions are indeed made rationally, then the price should reflect an equilibrium across the entire store which, in turn, requires that retailers internalize all pricing externalities across categories.
While it is common in the empirical retailing literature to assume chains behave as local monopolists (Walters and MacKenzie, 1988; Slade, 1995; Draganska and Klapper, 2007) , this assumption is not appropriate when the analysis is conducted at the shopping-basket level.
Further, more recent empirical evidence finds that retailers in a local market do indeed interact strategically on a category-basis (Richards and Hamilton, 2006) . Therefore, we assume retailers compete amongst themselves as differentiated oligopolists using Bertrand-Nash pricing strategies and allow for a complete matrix of inter-store competitive effects. Consequently, the first-order condition for product n in retailer j is given by the following expression: j for all N products in each store, j. Stacking the first-order conditions for all retailers and solving 2 for retail prices in matrix notation gives:
where p is an N x 1 vector of prices ( ), w is an N x 1 vector of wholesale prices, S is an p N x 1 vector of market shares, and S is an N x N matrix of share-derivatives with respect to all retail prices. Equation (16) describes the structure of the optimal response by retailers that manufacturers consider in setting wholesale prices.
Given the retailer responses described by equation (16), manufacturers set wholesale prices in order to maximize surplus over production costs. Assume each manufacturer f = 1, 2, ... In this equation, however, the term represents values that are not observable in the data -retail-wholesale pass-through terms. Therefore, we recover each pass-through rate by Specifically, we can solve for by totally differentiating (15) with respect to all wholesale prices and simplifying to recognize the fact that at we are find:
nm which can be simplified by defining a N x N matrix G with typical element g such that:
Using this expression to write the wholesale margin gives: N where I is an N x N identity matrix and * indicates element-by-element multiplication.
Substituting this expression back into the solution for retail prices provides a single expression for the whole -retail plus wholesale -margin in which unobserved wholesale prices do not appear:
where the first expression on the right side is the retail margin and the second is the wholesale margin. This solution, however, does not admit the possibility that retailers and their suppliers 
16 instead use non-linear contracts that include prices for shelf-space, or fixed fees for access to the store.
Therefore, we allow for non-linear or two-part contracts between retailers and njt manufacturers. In this case, assume the non-linear contract includes a per-product fixed fee, F , that need not be signed at this point (ie., if negative, represents a "franchise fee" from retailers to manufacturers, or if positive represents a form of "slotting fee" paid by manufacturers to retailers). With this assumption, retailer problem is now written as:
conditional on wholesale pricing decisions. To solve for the optimal retail prices, however, it is first necessary to derive an expression for how manufacturers include the possibility of fixed payments into their first-stage pricing decisions. The manufacturer's analog to (25), therefore, is
given by:
where: in equilibrium.
The game played between retailers and manufacturers follows the logic outlined by Berto Villas-Boas (2007) in that manufacturers set wholesale prices as Stackelberg leaders and then
Berto Villas Boas' (2007) empirical results support an alternative model in which manufacturers set 3 wholesale profits equal to zero and then extract all retail profits with a fixed fee, but this outcome is not consistent with observed retailing practice, ie., slotting fees, promotional allowances and other fees paid by manufacturers to retailers.
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retailers determine fixed fees in order to extract as much profit from suppliers as possible.
3
Assuming the participation constraint on manufacturers is binding, and that manufacturers set prices according to the problem defined in (17) above, we can then rewrite the retailer's optimization problem to solve for the fixed-fees, or shelf prices in the retailer-as-platform interpretation. Substituting the participation constraint into (25) and simplifying, the retailers' problem then becomes:
But, assuming retailers set shelf prices taking all others' shelf prices as given, (28) simplifies to:
which can then be solved for optimal margins and, hence, shelf prices. Taking the first order conditions to (29) for each retailer, stacking them for all retailers and writing in matrix notation, the optimal prices solve:
Substituting the expression for (w -c) from (23) above, solving for the price-cost margin, and invoking the symmetry assumption from the demand-side derivation yields an expression for shelf prices: Therefore, although shelf-prices per se are unobservable, we can recover them and estimate the impact of each demand-side element, including the number of products offered, N, on equilibrium shelf-prices using the estimation procedure described next. Kaiser and Wright (2006) derive an expression similar to (31) in their model of magazine and advertisement pricing to draw hypotheses regarding the effect of network size (number of subscribers) on advertising rates and subscription rates. However, the comparative statics in their model are relatively simple because they consider a single product. In the case of a multicategory retailer, similar conclusions do not follow as simply from the optimal pricing solution.
Rather, we introduce parameters in (31) that measure the estimated deviation from BertrandNash behavior in terms of both the retail (ö) and manufacturing (è) margins. This approach is similar to Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) drivers of competitive intensity among coffee manufacturers.
In our case, negative deviation from Bertrand-Nash on the wholesale side associated with 2 deeper product assortments (è < 0) implies that manufacturers are willing to compete more intensely for shelf access as they try to gain access to consumers who prefer a deeper assortment, or more products on the shelf in each category. Retailers reduce the price of shelf-space in order to attract manufacturers willing to bring more new products to the market. Consumers, on the 2 other hand, are willing to pay higher retail margins as assortments deepen if ö > 0. In this case,
we have the opposite effect to that described by Kaiser and Wright (2006) : consumers who choose a particular platform on the basis of a broad product assortment value manufacturers more than manufacturers value consumers, so the platform owners (retailers) essentially subsidize manufacturers in order to increase demand for the entire channel. Supermarket retailers differ from magazines in that they must compete among themselves for a fixed number of consumers (ie., are not monopolists) whereas manufacturers know they will supply to all retail stores. In other words, consumers single-home, while manufacturers multi-home (Armstrong, 2006; Doganoglu and Wright, 2006) . In terms of (31), the margin equation is now written:
where both retail and wholesale "deviation" parameters are written as linear functions of a constant term, prices and assortment depth in order to estimate the effect of each variable on each margin component: and With these expressions, the central hypothesis of the paper, namely that consumers are willing to pay higher margins for deeper product assortments, while wholesalers compete more intensely for access to (32) 20 retail consumers who value variety, is a joint test written as: Testing this hypothesis in a consistent way, however must take into account a number of econometric issues typical of structural retail -wholesale pricing models. We discuss these issues next.
Estimation Method
The econometric model consists of two parts: (1) the demand side given by equation (13) and the supply or pricing model given by (32). There are two primary concerns associated with estimation structural models of this type. First, prices and the number of products in (13) and market shares in (31) will be endogenous. Therefore, we estimate each part using consistent estimation procedures. Second, the pricing model uses parameters estimated in the demand model. In ths regard, we follow similar studies of retailer-manufacturer interactions (Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005, for example) and estimate the entire system sequentially, first estimating the demand system and then supply after substituting the demand parameters in. Although simultaneous estimation is preferred, the loss in efficiency is likely to be of little consequence when a large number of observations are used.
To address concerns regarding the likely endogeneity of prices, product numbers and conditional shares in the nested logit specification, estimates of both the demand and pricing models are obtained using generalized method of moments (GMM). In this way, we are able to use consistent estimates of the demand parameters, and then identify the vector of pricing parameters with an appropriate set of instruments. Our specific identification strategy is explained next.
Retail prices in the demand model are likely to be correlated with errors in the demand jt equation (î ) because these errors contain unobservable factors -shelf space allocation, in-store promotions and the like -that managers take into account in setting prices. This is also true of conditional store-shares and the number of products that appear on the right-hand side of our demand model. Therefore, a suitable set of instrumental variables must be found that are correlated with each of these variables, yet not with the retailer-specific errors. In this respect,
we follow other recent studies that use data similar to the data used here -multiple retailers within a single market. In a single market, using rival prices as in Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) is not valid because rivals are likely to experience the same demand shocks as others in the market. Therefore, we follow Berto Villas-Boas (2007) who argues that interacting input prices with product-specific dummies provides a set of instruments that are not only correlated with retail prices, but independent of unobserved factors that are likely to influence demand. This strategy is appropriate because different product categories are likely to vary in the extent to which they embody the manufacturing inputs considered here. Input prices, however, are not likely to be as effective in explaining variations in store share or assortment numbers. Therefore, we also interact product-specific dummies with lagged store-share and assortment values. If there is no serial correlation in the demand errors (which there is not), then these lagged values will be appropriate instruments. Again following Berto Villas-Boas (2007), we also include a set of seasonal binary variables to account for variation in the performance of different product categories at different times of the year. Results from a first-stage regression of retail prices on this set of instruments find that they explain over 99.0% of the variation in shelf prices and are statistically independent of the OLS demand errors. As Nevo (2001) explains, if prices set by all Manchanda, Ansari and Gupta (1999) construct a similar model of "shopping basket" purchase behavior, 5 but focus on a much smaller set of goods. Clearly, the choice of which items comprise a representative shopping basket is necessarily arbitrary, but for current purposes the top ten fixed weight items are appropriate because: (1) they represent a relatively large share of typical consumer expenditure, (2) they are manufactured by entities that have sufficient market power to set prices in a strategic (ie., to exploit indirect network effects) way, and (3) they each represent categories for which there is at least anecdotal evidence of manufacturers paying either slotting fees, promotional allowances, or some other explicit "price" for shelf space.
22 retailers in the sample are subject to the same demand shocks, then endogeneity will be a problem. Including a temporal trend and seasonal dummy variables, however, accounts for all time-related demand shocks that may cause prices in all stores in Visalia to move together.
Data: Grocery Retailing in Visalia
The data used in this study are provided by Fresh Look Marketing, Inc. (table 1a) .
Despite their statistical similarity, however, stores belonging to different chains appear to follow very dissimilar pricing and assortment strategies, as is apparent from the summary data in table 1a. For purposes of this study, we focus on the top ten fixed weight categories (by value) in order to construct a shopping basket of items that is broadly representative of that purchased by a typical customer. Across all stores, the top ten categories are: low fat milk, regular soft drinks,
5
Our retail scanner data coverage is complete for all traditional supermarket retailers. Other sources of 6 food supply include warehouse stores, convenience stores, food service outlets or shoppers who travel to other towns to shop. These sources of supply together form part of the outside option in the empirical model.
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beer, bread, ready-to-eat cereal, liquor, wine, lunch meat, cheese, and ice cream. On average, these categories account for X% of weekly expenditure in each store. Choosing to focus on a representative shopping basket is necessary for the objectives of this study because we are concerned with store-level pricing issues instead of the brand-specific vertical issues that are more typical of the consumer-packaged-good retailing literature. Shelf prices are determined as a result of the equilibrium demand and supply of shelf-space, so we have to completely characterize the value of that shelf space in order to address the issue at hand and answer whether network economics can explain what is observed in reality.
[ Wal-Mart stores in Visalia that sell food. This fact is important because it means that our data does not contain the "Wal-Mart gap" typical of other scanner-data studies. Third, all retailers follow a HI-LO pricing strategy wherein they maintain relatively high everyday shelf prices, but then periodically promote a number of brands via temporary price reductions. Price promotions create price variability both within stores over time and across stores in different chains. Fourth, Visalia is relatively isolated, so geographic competition from supermarkets in other towns is 24 likely to be limited. Table 1b provides some summary data regarding the competitive structure of the grocery retailing industry in Visalia, CA and some initial insights into the question that we address here.
First, notice in table 1a that there appears to be a pattern between average shelf prices within each category and the number of SKUs that comprise it. Namely, the more products on offer, the higher is the average price. This observation can be consistent with a number of explanations.
First, it may simply reflect the finding that consumers prefer variety (Draganksa and Jain, 2005; Richards and Hamilton, 2006) . Second, retailers that offer a greater variety of products may have higher stocking costs per SKU, so require higher prices in equilibrium. Third, the hypothesis advanced in this paper suggests that the apparent correlation between higher retail prices and assortment depth may be due to space-constrained retailers setting higher prices for products in categories where demand is the highest, and using shelf-space prices to induce manufacturers to provide a greater variety of products. Whether this is the case requires more detailed econometric evidence than that provided in this table, however.
[table 1b in here]
Results and Discussion
We first present the results from the first-stage demand model, and then follow with the categorypricing model and the implications for retailer platform pricing behavior. In each case, we establish the validity of the estimated model through a number of specification tests and then 25 discuss the specific parametric estimates and hypothesis tests that follow. Estimates of both the demand and pricing model are obtained with GMM using the identification strategy outlined above.
Nested Logit Shopping-Basket Demand
Recall that demand is defined on a multi-category or shopping-basket basis in which consumers make discrete, nested choices of whether to patronize a supermarket and, if so, which one to visit. Third, several of the demand parameters are of inherent interest both from a managerial and theoretical perspective. Perhaps most important for the objectives of this paper, the demand for goods from each store rises in the number of products offered in each category. This result is typically interpreted as implying that consumers prefer variety, which in turn suggests that consumers are willing to pay more for items sold through stores that stock a greater number of SKUs per unit of shelf-space. While this finding can partially explain the pattern shown in table 1a, it does not take into account the fact that manufacturers demand shelf-space as well. Next, while discounts have a positive and statistically significant effect on sales volume in the OLS model, the same is true only at a lower level of statistical significance in the GMM model. With similar caveats as to statistical significance, the demand-rotation effect of price promotions appears to cause demand to become more inelastic, which is consistent with previous studies using similar data (Chintagunta, 2002 ).
Because we model store choice using data from a number of common product categories, the price parameter is used to calculate the elasticity of store-choice. The matrix of store-choice elasticities is determined by the CES surplus function as shown in the technical appendix. Table   3 shows the matrix of own-and cross-price elasticities for each store, based on an average over all of the top ten categories. These elasticities are plausible and suggest that, unlike many other 27 studies in the empirical industrial organization literature that use retail-level data for a single store on the assumption that competitive effects are negligible (Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005, for example) the cross-price elasticities among stores are indeed non-zero.
[table 3 in here]
Equilibrium Shelf-Space Prices
Shelf-space prices are determined by the equilibrium between manufacturers' demand for distribution, consumers' demand for a variety of goods and the fixed supply of shelf-space.
Because shelf-space is fixed, retailer's allocate shelf space by determining how many products to stock and what prices to set, both to consumers and manufacturers. Therefore, how retail prices and assortment depth impact both the size of the total margin and allocation of the margin between retailers and manufacturers is critical. Table 4 presents estimates of the shelf-space pricing model. In order to highlight the importance of including both the retail and wholesale margin, we present the results from a restricted model in which wholesalers are assumed to be perfectly competitive (ie., zero margin) and one in which both retailers and wholesalers may earn non-zero margins. In each case, we present OLS estimates, which are not corrected for endogeneity, and GMM estimates, which are.
First, note in the retail-margin model that the fitted value of ö suggests a significant departure from Bertrand-Nash pricing downstream. Because it is less than 1.0, this finding suggests that retailers price closer to the competitive level than Nash. While deviations below 28 1.0 can be due to either non-linear pricing (Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005) or omitted competition from other retailers (Chintagunta, 2002) , we account for both of those factors here. Therefore, we conclude that retailers have an inherent incentive to price more competitively than would otherwise be the case. By allowing the extent of deviation to depend upon pricing and assortment strategies, we can provide a better explanation as to the nature of this incentive.
Based on the estimates in table 4, the downstream margin appears to be positively correlated with prices, which makes intuitive sense. By including retail prices in the margin expression, the estimated effect of increasing variety must be interpreted as a partial effect with retail prices held constant. All else equal, therefore, retail margins are negatively related to the number of SKUs, so wholesale prices must rise with variety. Retailers may be willing to take lower margins if offering more products tends to build volume at the expense of rival stores, so manufacturers are willing to pay higher prices for access to their shelves. This conclusion, however, again ignores vertical relationships with manufacturers.
In the retail -wholesale margin model, we see that this effect is reversed. In other words, when the possibility of a positive wholesale margin is accounted for, greater variety is associated with higher retail margins, but lower wholesale, or manufacturer margins. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis described above. Namely, retailers understand that their downstream pricing power rises in the number of SKUs they stock. Therefore, as retail surplus rises in either a higher willingness to pay from the marginal retail customer, or a greater number of inframarginal customers, manufacturers compete more intensely for a share of the retail profits. This competition causes retailers to force wholesale prices lower (thus raising retail margins), and accept correspondingly lower prices for their shelf space. Although wholesale prices are lower, the positive feedback effect that characterizes all two-sided markets arises through retailers' reducing the price of access in order to attract more manufacturers and, hence, raise their own margins by further increasing the number of products on the shelf.
As a corollary to these results, our finding suggests that the demand for shelf-space from manufacturers is in some sense more important to retailer's pricing decisions than is consumers' demand for variety. In other words, retailers would rather subsidize manufacturer's access to distribution in order to build pricing power than reduce retail prices in order to build the size of the network. This is opposite to Kaiser and Wright (2006) who find that magazine publishers have an incentive to subsidize subscribers in order to increase demand for the medium, and charge advertisers higher prices to offset the lost subscriber revenue. With retail margins rising in the depth of assortment, our findings suggest that the supermarkets in our data would rather make money from the buy rather than on the sell, perhaps explaining the rise of retailers such as Target and Wal-Mart that do not accept slotting fees and rather set low retail prices in order to maximize customer traffic.
Another way of thinking of this result is in terms of how expanding the size of the network influences the pricing power of retailers and manufacturers. By offering a wider selection of products, retailers have greater pricing power over the downstream market because consumers' willingness to pay rises in variety. Manufacturers, however, have less market power over retailers because by increasing the number of products on their shelves, retailers are essentially allowing for more competition for shelf space. More competition means lower margins and less surplus available to pay for shelf-space access.
[table 4 in here]

Simulating the Impact of Network Size
In equilibrium, the price of shelf space is equal to the total margin. The impact of expanding the number of products offered on shelf prices, therefore, depends on the net effect on both retail and 22 manufacturer margins. Although the relative size of the ö and è parameters is clear from table 4, we demonstrate the net effect more formally, and on a per-store basis through numerical simulation. Based on the hypothesis tests conducted in the previous section, we expect that increasing the number of products on offer in a typical category will have the effect of decreasing wholesale margins and increasing retail margins. How the net effect influences shelf-space prices, which must equal the total margin in equilibrium, remains an empirical question. From the results reported in table 5, shelf prices fall in the number of products uniformly across our sample. In equilibrium, therefore, retail managers induce manufacturers to increase the supply of new products by reducing shelf prices, which increases consumer demand, raises retail margins and provides further incentive for retailers to attract new manufacturers. Two-sided retail demand, while fundamentally different from that witnessed in either technology or media markets, is nonetheless a significant driver of retail strategy.
[table 5 in here]
Conclusions
As intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers, retailers must manage a two-sided demand for their services. Consumers demand the products retailers stock on their shelves, while manufacturers demand shelf space for distribution purposes. In this study, we present a theoretical model of indirect network effects in supermarket retailing and estimate how these effects impact pricing and assortment strategy among a small set of competing retailers.
We estimate a hybrid CES / nested logit model of store choice using two-years of weekly scanner data from the top 6 supermarkets in Visalia, California. The econometric model captures consumers' preference for variety, as well as potential network effects due to changes in assortment depth, defined as the number of SKUs stocked per category per week. The CES / nested logit model is defined at the "shopping basket" level, meaning that we include data from the top 10 categories in each store to measure store choice probabilities. Using parameters estimated from the CES / nested logit model, we estimate a second-stage model of supermarket pricing and assortment behavior in which we allow for non-linear pricing contracts between retailers and manufacturers and Nash behavior among retailers. With this non-linear pricing model, we are able to identify prices for store shelves, which are commonly unobserved in studies of retail pricing and vertical contracting.
Our results show that consumers exhibit a strong preference for variety, or assortment depth. Because of their preference for variety, and the fact that consumers single-home in a multi-platform retail environment, retailers have an incentive to reduce shelf prices to manufacturers in order to increase the number of products on their shelves. Manufacturers, in turn, are willing to accept lower upstream margins as assortment depth rises, in order to compete for a share of the higher retail margins that result. This finding has a number of implications for retail strategy, and explains many of the recent trends observed in the supermarkets industry.
Namely, charging excessive slotting fees is not the best way to exploit the two-sided demand faced by all retailers. Rather than subsidize consumers in order to make money from suppliers, as is the case in the yellow pages and magazine industries, retailers should do the opposite in order to build retail margins on the items they sell. Among the different platforms currently operating in the supermarket industry, traditional supermarkets generally follow a yellow-pages type of model, while successful and emerging platforms such as Super Target and Wal-Mart follow the strategy suggested by our research. 
